Brigham Young University

BYU ScholarsArchive
International Congress on Environmental
Modelling and Software

1st International Congress on Environmental
Modelling and Software - Lugano, Switzerland June 2002

Jul 1st, 12:00 AM

Emissions Trading Experiments: Investment
Uncertainty and Liability
Takao Kusakawa
Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/iemssconference
Kusakawa, Takao and Saijo, Tatsuyoshi, "Emissions Trading Experiments: Investment Uncertainty and Liability" (2002). International
Congress on Environmental Modelling and Software. 146.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/iemssconference/2002/all/146

This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Civil and Environmental Engineering at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for
inclusion in International Congress on Environmental Modelling and Software by an authorized administrator of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more
information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Emissions Trading Experiments:
Investment Uncertainty and Liability

Takao Kusakawa *1, *3 Tatsuyoshi Saijo *2, *3
*1 Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, Japan
*2 Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan
*3 Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry, 1-3-1 Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda, Tokyo 100-8901,
Japan
E-mail addresses: kusakawa@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp and saijo@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp

Abstract: We conducted three experiments on emissions trading. In experiment 1, we found very high
efficiency under no investment uncertainty. In experiment 2, we introduced irreversibility of investment
and investment time lag. Under these conditions, we found two cases: the success case and the failure case.
Then we introduced three liability rules: seller's liability, Kyoto-first liability, and country-first liability. We
found a new case called the theoretical price increase case under country-first, and the intentional
bankruptcy case under Kyoto-first.
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What would happen if 0.6 unit of trading in the
example? Then the cost of Russia is 1+0.6=1.6
and the domestic reduction cost in Japan is
(1-0.6)10=4. Therefore, the sum of benefit and
profit of both countries become 5.4(=11-1.6-4).
Since the maximum sum of benefit and profit is 9,
the efficiency of 0.6 unit of trading becomes
5.4/9=60%. One of our concerns in emissions
trading experiments is to find what type of
institutions would result in high efficacy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Emissions trading is regarded as a cost-effective
tool to reduce greenhouse gases. Consider an
example. Suppose that reduction cost of one unit
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in Japan is 10, and
the cost in Russia is 1. If each country must
reduce one unit of GHGs respectively, then the
total cost would be 11. On the other hand, if
Russia reduces two units, then the cost would be
2. That is, Japan pays some amount of money
between 1 and 10 to Russia, and asks Russia to
reduce one unit of GHGs in return, that is called
emissions trading.

The above example describes trading only. In
order to attain further reduction, it is necessary to
introduce reduction investment such as new
instruments. “When” and “how” reduction
investment is carried out is important decision
variables as well as its trading. In order to

The sum of benefit and profit with emissions
trading in the above example is 9 (=10+1-2).
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quite low.

understand how emissions trading really works,
we conducted three major experiments.

2.

The second one is the “success” case. Due to low
prices of emissions permits around the beginning,
each country hesitates about conducting
reduction investment. This causes excess
demand for emissions permits and hence the
pressure of price rise prevails. This results in
gradual price increase, but not quite due to price
inertia. Each country starts domestic reduction in
accordance with price increase, but it is not
sufficient enough to attain the Kyoto target.
Therefore, the countries that demand emissions
permits conduct excessive reduction around the
end of the period in order to avoid
non-compliance penalty. The economic
efficiency of this pattern is relatively high.

EXPERIMENT 1

Hizen and Saijo [2001, 2002] conducted 13
sessions using 78 subjects in 1998. This
experiment assumes reversible investment.
Reversible investment means that even after
investment decision, the decision maker can stop
the investment and return to the original plants.
Under this rather unrealistic assumption, they
observed that emissions trading attains
extremely high efficiency regardless the choice
of trading methods and information closure and
disclosure. That is, getting rid of the real nature
of investment and paying attention to trading,
they observed high efficiency. The reason why
they
conducted
reversible
investment
experiment is that they want to compare the
results with reversible and irreversible
investment. Bohm [1997] also obtained a similar
result.

3.

They use two types of trading methods in
Experiment 2: bilateral trading and auction.
Auction is not necessarily better than bilateral
trading from the viewpoint of efficiency. Six out
of seven success patterns fall into the method of
bilateral trading. In auction, every subject can
take a look at all information of trading
instantaneously since everything is revealed to
subjects. Therefore, subjects can respond to the
informational change very quickly. On the other
hand, in bilateral trading, a pair of subjects must
communicate each other and hence it takes a
considerable amount of time. It seems that this
“friction” of the trading method makes the
system stable. They also use two types of
information control: informational disclosure
and closure. This control does not influence to
the results of experiment.

EXPERIMENT 2

Hizen, Kusakawa, Niizawa and Saijo [2001]
conducted 12 sessions using 72 subjects in 1999.
When they introduce reversibility of investment,
they found two patterns of price dynamics in
emissions trading.
The first one is the “failure” case. Emissions
permits are traded with relatively high price
around the beginning of a session. For this
reason, several countries consider that reduction
investment is profitable, and hence they conduct
investment actively. This causes over-investment
worldwide, and hence results in excess supply of
emissions permits. Nonetheless, the transaction
prices do not go down due to the relatively high
price at the beginning and its inertia. Therefore,
the price of permits slumps at the end of the
period. The economic efficiency of this pattern is

There are other experiments conducted by Baron
[2001] of International Energy Agency (IEA),
Unipede, and others that are very similar to
Experiment 2. The price dynamics in these
experiments falls into the “failure case.” Subjects
in the experiments faced pressure on the
compliance of the Kyoto Protocol and therefore
responded
excessively
through
excess
investment. It seems that subjects in these
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Consider the case where a seller country is not
penalized when she cannot deliver emissions
permits to buyer countries and at the same time
the Protocol imposes monetary penalty when a
country cannot attain the target. Under the
“Kyoto-first” liability system, in order to avoid
penalty, a country must keep emissions permits
to achieve the target of the Kyoto Protocol. But,
once she keeps the permits that clear the target,
she does not care about the trading of emission
permits among countries. That is, the country
might cause default intentionally since she does
not have to deliver permits as she promised
under this liability system.

experiments behaved that way.

4.

EXPERIMENT 3

Kusakawa and Saijo [2002] conducted 18
sessions using 90 subjects. Our attention is
liability of emissions permits in addition to
trading methods and information disclosure
based upon Experiment 2. Since the number of
sessions is not enough to conduct statistical
analysis, the following are our tentative findings.
There are two types of liability in emissions
trading among countries: liability of trading
among countries and liability to the Kyoto
Protocol. Regardless the status of reduction in a
seller country, she must provide emissions
permits following the contract, which is called
“seller’s liability” system. Experiments 1 and 2
implicitly assume this liability rule.

On the other hand, under the “country-first”
system, a country must submit permits to the
Kyoto regime in order to avoid penalty after
clearing the transactions among countries.
Therefore, the probability of default of
“country-first” would be smaller than that of
“Kyoto-first.”

On the other hand, a buyer country might not be
able to receive all emissions permits based upon
the contract depending on the status of seller
countries, which is called “buyer’s liability”
system. No detailed analysis has been conducted
on buyer’s liability system so far. In our
experiment, we designed two types of buyer’s
liability system depending on the order of
liability. The “country-first” liability system is
that trading liability among countries has its
priority and “Kyoto-first” liability system is that
the promise in the Kyoto Protocol has its priority.

Marrakesh Accords employed the seller liability
in the Kyoto Protocol. However, it would be
inevitable to use futures transactions even under
the seller liability system soon. In this sense,
Experiment 3 is intended to the post-Kyoto
regime as well as the Kyoto regime.
Our experimental controls in Experiment 3 are
(a) liability system (seller, country-first, and
Kyoto-first)
(b) trading methods (auction, and bilateral); and
(c) contract information (disclosure, and
closure).

In addition to the liability rules, it is important
how to design the “default” system when a
country cannot achieve the trading contracts to
other countries. That is, the order of defaulting
countries and the chain reaction among the
countries influence the final results of balance
sheets. We designed a default system that is
independent of the order and the chain reaction.
The other design is the penalty system when a
country cannot attain the target of the Kyoto
Protocol.

Under this design, we have 12 (=3x2x2)
institutions that should be considered. But, since
the information under auction is revealed to
every subject, we cannot conduct sessions with
auction and information closure. Therefore, we
have 9 different institutions. So far, we
conducted two sessions for each institution.
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Figure 1. An Example of a Session
although the theoretical price gradually goes up.
The transaction prices toward the end show
yo-yo, but this does not reflect actual demand
and supply. We name the area between two lines,
the price prediction line and the theoretical price
line the discrepancy area. When the price
prediction line is below the theoretical price line,
we put minus to the area. The discrepancy area is
regarded as the degree of “bubble.” In other
words, if it is positive and big, the expected
transaction prices are much greater than the
theoretical price that equates demand and supply.

Figure 1 shows a session. The horizontal axis is
for time, and twenty minutes are regarded as one
year. The vertical axis represents price. At the
beginning of each year, ten subjects make a
guess on the average price in this year, and then
conduct reduction investment. The diamonds in
Figure 1 show price prediction of each subject
and the average of price prediction of all subjects
is represented by the line graph. After the
decision of reduction investment, we can find a
theoretical price level that equates the quantity
demanded and supplied. We also show this line
graph too. Notice that this theoretical price level
cannot be observed in real data in emissions
trading. On the other hand, experimenter can
observe this price dynamics since she knows
demand and supply curves. Squares in Figure 1
show actual transactions in our session. Due to
inefficient reduction investment, the transaction
prices around the beginning are not high enough

Figure 2 shows the locations of all 18 sessions.
The horizontal axis shows efficiency and the
vertical axis show the discrepancy area. First,
look at the seller liability sessions represented by
circles. Then these six sessions are classified as
the “failure” and the “success” patterns that were
found in Experiment 2. Second, consider the
country-first liability sessions represented by
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Figure 2. Four Cases in Experiment 3

triangles. Then we find a new pattern called the
theoretical price increase pattern in addition to
the two cases. This is exactly the reverse case as
the failure pattern. That is, due to low transaction
prices and not enough reduction investment, the
theoretical price goes up toward the end. Figure
1 shows this case. Finally, look at the Kyoto-first
liability sessions represented by squares. Then a
new pattern called the intentional bankruptcy
case shows up in addition to the three cases. In
this case, many subjects sold emissions permits
in large quantities without conducting reduction
investment fully, and hence they intentionally
cause default. We cannot obtain clear-cut results
on the effect of transaction methods and
information disclosure.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The results of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2
were reported in COP4 at Buenos Aires in 1998
and SBSTA10 at Bonn in 1999, and COP6 at
Den Hague in 2000. Furthermore, tentative
results of Experiment 3 were reported in COP7 at
Marrakesh in 2001.

Third, we find that country-first liability is better
than Kyoto-first liability with respect to
efficiency in addition to the default property
mentioned above. Negotiators and designers of
the Kyoto Protocol could choose Kyoto-first
since it is natural, but our experimental results

First, we found that irreversibility of investment
and the time lag effect play important roles on
the efficiency of emissions trading.
Second, the intentional bankruptcy case occurred
only in Kyoto-first liability sessions with
bilateral trading and information closure. That is,
under Kyoto-first liability intentional default did
not happen with double auction and bilateral
trading with information closure. Under open
information, subjects could notice over-selling
easily. This finding shows that open information
is a key factor in institutional design to avoid
intentional default.
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show that this is not.
Fourth, we find almost no difference between
seller’s liability and country-first with respect to
efficiency. However, the variance of efficiency
of seller’s liability is larger than that of
country-first.
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